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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Municipal Corporations-Tort Liabilty of Municipal Corporations
In Glenn v. City of Raleigh' the North Carolina Supreme Court has
raised anew the question of whether the maintenance of a city park is
a governmental or proprietary function. Plaintiff sought recovery for
injuries sustained while picknicking in a park which is maintained and
operated by the city for profit. While eating, he was struck on the head
with a rock which was thrown from the ground by the blade of a rotary
lawn mower being operated by a city employee in the park. The city's
negligence was shown by the fact that the mower did not have a guard
around the front of it and that the city knew of this defect. Testimony
of the park maintenance superintendent showed that he had seen rocks
thrown by a rotary mower travel ". . . maybe 50 feet before it hit the
ground."2  In the trial the defendant made a motion for nonsuit at the
close of the evidence on the ground that the city was immune from suit
since the maintenance of a park is a governmental function. The motion
was overruled and defendant appealed, contending that the motion should
have been granted. The supreme court granted a new trial because of
errors in the instructions to the jury, but it did not answer the question
of law3 as to whether or not the maintenance of a park is a governmental
function.
The rule is well settled4 that a municipal corporation is immune from
suit for negligence if performing a governmental function5 but liable
246 N. C. 469, 98 S. E. 2d 913 (1957).
Id. at 471, 98 S. E. 2d at 914.
'See Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N. C. 340, 23 S. E. 2d 770 (1942) (court
answered question of whether governmental or proprietary function where case
involved the question of whether or not defendant's demurrer should have been
overruled); Hodges v. Charlotte, 214 N. C. 737, 200 S. E. 889 (1939) (plain-
tiff appealed from motion of nonsuit, court holding a governmental function);
Lowe v. Gastonia, 211 N. C. 564, 191 S. E. 7 (1937) (question of whether a pro-
prietary or governmental function raised by defendant's motion for nonsuit at end
of plaintiff's evidence, court held proprietary function).
'Immunity for a municipality grew out of the ancient axiom, "The king can do
no wrong." It has been followed in the common law jurisdictions and has come
to apply to municipal corporations as well as to the state. It has been criticized by
the text writers on the subject but the doctrine still appears to be strongly en-
trenched despite the efforts of some legislatures to restrict immunity. See Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25) ; Borehard,
Theories of Governtmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-
27) ; Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 CoLum. L.
Rxv. 577, 734 (1928) ; Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability, 54 HARv. L.
REv. 437 (1941); Green, Mtnicipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. Rxv. 355
(1944); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MicH. L. REv. 41 (1949); Tooke,
Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 VA. L. RlV. 97 (1932). See articles
collected in 9 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROD. 180-370 (1942).
Densmore v. Birmingham, 223 Ala. 210, 135 So. 320 (1931) ; City of Phoenix
v. Greer, 43 Ariz. 214, 29 P. 2d 1062 (1934) ; Prifty v. City of Waterbury, 133
Conn. 654, 54 A. 2d 260 (1947) ; Johnston v. Atlanta, 71 Ga. App. 552, 31 S. E.
2d 417 (1944) ; Lauxman v. Tisher, 213 Iowa 654, 239 N. W. 675 (1931) ; Wynkoop
v. Hagerstown, 159 Md. 194, 150 Atl. 447 (1930) ; Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass.
387, 114 N. E. 722 (1917) ; Reynolds v. Nashua, 93 N. H. 28, 35 A. 2d 194 (1943) ;
1957]
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if performing a proprietary function.0 Recent decisions of nearly every
state give a variety of expression in an effort to distinguish governmental
functions from proprietary functions.1 "The liability or non-liability of a
municipality for its torts does not depend upon the nature of the tort, the
relations existing between the city and the person injured, or whether
the city was engaged in the management of tangible property but depends
upon the capacity in which the city was acting at the time."8  While
many tests have been used to distinguish governmental from proprietary
functions, the test used in the principal case ". . . is whether the act is
for the common good of all without the element of special corporate bene-
fit or pecuniary profit. If it is there is no liability, if it is not there is
liability."9
Under this test, the question of whether or not a city derives revenue
from its parks may have an effect as to the liability for negligence of
its employees.10 However, it has been held that the fact that a munici-
pality has the authority to charge for the use of the park or its apparatus
does not make the municipality liable unless the charges were in fact
made." Nor does the mere fact that a city makes an incidental charge
for a small service rendered in connection with the park necessarily
mean that the city is performing a proprietary function in the maintenance
and operation of its parks.12
Augustine v. Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928) ; Broome v. Charlotte,
208 N. C. 729, 182 S. E. 325 (1935) ; Zangerle v. City of Cleveland, 145 Ohio St.
347, 61 N. E. 2d 720 (1945) ; Wold v. City of Portland, 166 Ore. 455, 112 P. 2d
469 (1941); City of Houston v. Quionones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S. W. 2d 259
(1944); Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443 (1926); Robb v.
Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 432, 6 N. W. 2d 222 (1942). The duty to maintain streets and
sidewalks in good repair has been generally held to be a corporate duty. Colorado
City v. Liafe, 28 Colo. 468, 65 Pac. 630 (1901) ; Gatewood v. Frankfort, 170 Ky.
292, 185 S. W. 847 (1916) ; Warren v. Booneville, 151 Miss. 457, 118 So. 290
(1928); Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N. C. 340, 23 S. E. 2d 42 (1942); Rad-
ford v. Asheville, 219 N. C. 185, 13 S. E. 2d 256 (1941); Speas v. Greensboro, 204
N.:C. 239, 167 S. E. 807 (1933) ; Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N. C. 431 (1884) ; White-
side v. Benton County, 114 Wash. 463, 195 Pac. 519 (1921).
' Sanders v. Long Beach, 54 Cal. App. 2d 651, 129 P. 2d 511 (1942); Miami
v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942) ; Wray v. Independence, 150 Kan. 258,
92 P. 2d 84 (1939) ; Barker v. Santa Fe, 47 N. M. 85, 136 P. 2d 480 (1943) ;
Honoman v. Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 535, 185 Ati. 750 (1936); Jensen c. Juul, 66
S. D. 1, 278 N. W. 6 (1938); Farmer v. Poultney School Dist., 113 Vt. 147, 30
A. 2d 89 (1943) ; Burson v. Bristol, 176 Va. 53, 10 S. E. 2d 541 (1940) ; Villal-
pando v. Cheyenne, 51 Wyo. 300, 65 P. 2d 1109 (1937).
' 18 MCQUILLEN, MUNIcIPAL COaRPOATIONS § 53.29 (3d ed. 1950).
'Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind. 18, 23, 112 N. E. 994, 996 (1916).
'246 N. C. at 476, 98 S. E. 2d at 918, quoting Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass.
387, 390, 114 N. E. 722, 727 (1917).
1' Carta v. Norwalk, 108 Conn. 697, 145 AtI. 158 (1929) ; Cornelisen v. Atlanta,
146 Ga. 416, 91 S. E. 415 (1917).
" Cornelisen v. Atlanta, 146 Ga. 416, 91 S. E. 415 (1917) ; Bolster v. Lawrence,
225 Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722 (1917); Caughlan v. Omaha, 103 Neb. 726, 174
N. W. 220 (1918) ; Blair v. Granger, 24 R. I. 17, 5FAtl. 1042 (1902).
2 Hannon v. Waterbury, 106 Conn. 13, 136 Atl. 876 (1927) (small charge
made for use of pool partially covering expense of maintenance) ; Jones v. Atlanta,
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According to the majority view in this country, the maintenance
of a public park is a governmental function and the city is not liable for
injuries caused by the negligence of its employees unless such liability
is imposed by statute.13 The two basic reasons. given for this rule are
that parks protect the public health,14 and that it would be contrary to
public policy to impose liability.15
The minority view is that the municipality is exercising a proprietary
function and must use ordinary care in maintaining the park and in
making it reasonably safe for use. 16 The courts holding that liability
is imposed upon a city have arrived at their conclusions for the follow-
ing reasons: (a) a power is given to operate the parks and, by analogy
to the liability imposed in the maintenance of streets, a duty is raised
to exercise due care ;17 (b) since an individual has an implied invitation
to visit a park, a duty arises to exercise reasonable care in keeping the
premises safe ;18 (c) where a city has a duty cast upon it, either manda-
tory or permissive, it is exercising a proprietary function as long as the
duty is not in nature governmental and as long as the particular activity
could be carried on by an individual;19 and (d) since many of the
people in the parks and playgrounds are children of the poor whose
35 Ga. App. 370, 133 S. E. 512 (1926) (bather had to pay a charge of ten cents
to use the pool). But see Pickett v. Jacksonville, 155 Fla. 439, 20 So. 2d 484
(1945) (court reversed sustaining of demurrer where declaration alleged negli-
gence of city in operation of pool where deceased had paid for use of the pool) ;
Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443 (1926) (city held acting in
private capacity when admission charged for use of swimming pool).
"Epstein v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 283, 132 At. 467 (1926); Harvey v.
Savannah, 59 Ga. App. 12, 199 S. E. 653 (1938) ; Lythell v. City of Waverly, 335
Ill. App. 397, 82 N. E. 2d 207 (1948); Hensley v. Gowrie, 203 Iowa 388, 212
N. W. 714 (1927) ; Hibbard v. Wichita, 98 Kan. 498, 159 Pac. 399 (1916) ; Board
of Park Comm'rs v. Shanklin, 304 Ky. 43, 199 S. W. 2d 721 (1947),; Hennessy v.
Boston, 265 Mass. 559, 164 N. E. 470 (1929) ; Royston v. Charlotte, 278 Mich.
255, 270 N. W. 288 (1936) ; Emmons v. City of Virginia, 152 Minn. 295, 188 N. W.
561 (1922) ; Piasecny v. Manchester, 82 N. H. 458, 136 AUt. 357 (1926) ; Bisbing
v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78 Atl. 196 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910) ; Stuver v.
Auburn, 171 Wash. 76, 17 P. 2d 614 (1932) ; Nemet v. Kenosha, 169 Wis. 379, 172
N. W. 711 (1919).4 Heino v. Grand Rapids, 202 Mich. 363, 168 N. W. 512 (1918) ; Caughlan v.
Omaha, 103 Neb. 726, 174 N. W. 220 (1919).
5 Harvey v. Savannah, 59 Ga. App. 12, 199 S. E. 653 (1938) ; Bolster v. Law-
rence, 225 Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722 (1917).
'
6 Edwards v. San Diego, 126 Cal. App. 1, 14 P. 2d 119 (1932) (liability im-
posed by statute) ; Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 Pac. 1040 (1913) ; Kokomo
v. Loy, 185 Ind. App. 18, 112 N. E. 994 (1916); Capp v. St. Louis, 251 Mo.
345, 158 S. W. 616 (1913) ; Augustine v. Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732
(1928) ; City of Mangum v. Powell, 196 Okla. 306, 165 P. 2d 136 (1946) ; Miller
v. Philadelphia, 345 Pa. 1, 25 A. 2d 185 (1942) ; Haithcock v. Columbia, 115 S. C.
29, 104 S. E. 335 (1920) (liability imposed by statute); Waco v. Branch, 117
Tex. 394, 5 S. W. 2d 498 (1928) ; Ashworth v. Clarksburg, 118 W. Va. 476, 190
S. E. 763 (1937).
"Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind. 18, 112 N. E. 994 (1916).
"0 Miller v. Philadelphia, 345 Pa. 1, 25 A. 2d 185 (1942).
" Van Dyke v. Utica, 196 N. Y. Supp. 277 (1922).
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parents let them run free while they work, there is a duty upon the
city to maintain reasonably safe premises.2 0
In North Carolina, a governmental function has been found in the
collection of trash 21 and garbage"2 2 the operation of an incinerator, 23 the
transmission of electricity solely for street lighting,24 the erection of a
water tank,25 police26 and fire2 protection, the maintenance of public
buildings28 and traffic light operation.29  However, maintenance of an
electric power line which ran to a consumer,30 operation of a golf course
3 l
and maintenance of an airport 2 have all been held to be proprietary
functions. Liability is.imposed on municipalities for wrongful acts com-
mitted in maintenance of streets,33 sidewalks, 34 and bridges 35 This
liability is imposed on the ground that that there is a duty to provide
reasonably safe facilities, even though the functions are governmental.
Liability for the failure to have reasonably comfortable jails is set out
by constitutional provision,3 6 but a city is not liable for the negligence
of its jailers since it is in the exercise of a governmental function.3
The question of a city's liability for its negligence in the operation
of a public park was left unanswered in an earlier North Carolina case3 ,
where the supreme court sustained the overruling of a demurrer. The
20 Capp v. St. Louis, 251 Mo. 345, 158 S. W. 616 (1913).
21 Snider v. High Point, 168 N. C. 608, 85 S. E. 15 (1915).
"2James v. Charlotte, 183 N. C. 630, 112 S. E. 423 (1922) (although a small
charge was made for the service, court held not a proprietary function).
" Scales v. Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 469, 127 S. E. 543 (1925).
24 Baker v. Lumberton, 239 N. C. 401, 79 S. E. 2d 886 (1953).
"McKinney v. High Point, 237 N. C. 66, 74 S. E. 2d 440 (1953) (dictum).
2 Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N. C. 504, 193 S. E. 814 (1937); Hobbs v. City of
Washington, 168 N. C. 293, 84 S. E. 391 (1915) ; Mcllhenney v. Wilmington, 127
N. C. 146, 37 S. E. 187 (1900).
7 Harrington v. Greenville, 159 N. C. 632, 75 S. E. 849 (1912); Peterson v.
Wilmington, 130 N. C. 76, 40 S. E. 853 (1902).
2" Pleasants v. Greensboro, 192 N. C. 820, 135 S. E. 321 (1926).
" Hamilton v. Hamlet, 238 N. C. 741, 78 S. E. 2d 770 (1953); Hodges v.
Charlotte, 214 N. C. 737, 200 S. E. 889 (1939).
"0 Fisher v. New Bern, 140 N. C. 506, 53 S. E. 342 (1906).
"
1Lowe v. Gastonia, 211 N. C. 564, 191 S. E. 7 (1937).
"2 Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N. C. 134, 53 S. E. 2d 313 (1949).
" Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N. C. 340, 23 S. E. 2d 42 (1942). Speas v.
Greensboro, 204 N. C. 239, 167 S. E. 807 (1933) ; Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N. C. 431
(1884).
" Radford v. Asheville, 219 N. C. 185, 13 S. E. 2d 256 (1941); Rollins v.
Winston-Salem, 176 N. C. 411, 97 S. E. 211 (1918); Revis v. Raleigh, 150 N. C.
348, 63 S. E. 1049 (1909).
2" Michaux v. Rocky Mount, 193 N. C. 550, 137 S. E. 663 (1927) ; Graham v.
Charlotte, 186 N. C. 649, 120 S. E. 466 (1923).
" N. C. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6. See Coley v. Statesville, 121 N. C. 301, 28 S. E,
482 (1897) ; Shields v. Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794 (1896).
27 Parks v. Princeton, 217 N. C. 361, 8 S. E. 2d 217 (1940) ; Nichols v. Town
of Fountain, 165 N. C. 166, 80 S. E. 1059 (1914) (intoxicated man locked up in
unconscious state, jail burned); Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N. C. 237, 9 S. E. 695
(1898) (prisoner contracted illness due to improperly heated jail).




defendant's demurrer contended that the maintenance of a public park
is a governmental function, but the court held that the facts alleged
in the complaint were not sufficient to enable it to determine as a matter
of law that the defendant was engaged in a governmental function. At
a later appeal,39 defendant's motion of nonsuit was affirmed on the
ground that there was no evidence at the trial tending to show that
plaintiff's intestate's death was caused by defendant's negligence. In
this case the court said that if it was conceded that the operation of the
park was a governmental function, "... it does not follow as a matter of
law that defendants owed no duty to .. . exercise reasonable care to
provide facilities which were reasonably safe, or that defendants would
not be liable to plaintiff for a breach of such duty."'4
In the principal case, the court intimated that the operation of the
city park was a proprietary function. This idea was based on the fact
that the city received a net revenue of over $18,000 for the fiscal year
which it used for the capital maintenance of park area, building items,
paying salaries, buying fuel, etc. Accordingly, the court reasoned that
this might remove it from the category of incidental income and import
such primary benefit to the city as to make this a proprietary function.
41
The court seems to be implying that it will use the pecuniary advantage
test but it does not say how much revenue is necessary to produce
sufficient pecuniary advantage on which to impose municipal liability.
Perhaps the court would have been on sounder ground to have held that
operation of public parks raises a duty on the city to exercise due care
under the circumstances as it has held in the cases of streets and side-
walks. 42  This would eliminate the difficulty of applying the pecuniary
advantage test and by a definite holding would let the bar and the
courts know the North Carolina position as far as municipal liability
for maintenance of parks is concerned.
KARL N. HILL, JR.
"White v. Charlotte, 211 N. C. 186, 189 S. E. 492 (1937).
"Id. at 188, 189 S. E. at 493.
41246 N. C. at 477, 98 S. E. 2d at 919.
42246 N. C. at 478, 98 S. E. 2d at 920. In the concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Denny took the view that municipalities may be liable in tort even if the city is
engaged in a governmental function. He rejects the pecuniary advantage test
used by the court, pointing out that the total receipts for Raleigh's two parks
was not sufficient to operate all the parks. A recent Florida case, Hargrove v.
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957), followed the reasoning of the concurring
opinion. The court reversed its previous position and held that a muinicipal corpo-
ration is liable in tort for the negligence of a police officer under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
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